Humanism and Antisemitism

Today, “humanism” usually denotes a secular ethical outlook that stresses human dignity, reason, tolerance, individual rights, and scientific inquiry.  In mid-19th-century Germany, however, the term repeatedly referred to something far more radical: a philosophical movement derived from Ludwig Feuerbach that many contemporaries regarded as a bridge to socialism and communism.  That original meaning has largely vanished from present-day usage.

An intellectual genealogy runs from Hegel through Feuerbach to socialism.  Hegel had already replaced traditional Christianity with a philosophical system centered on Reason.  Feuerbach went farther, declaring that God was simply a projection of human qualities.  As he summarized his own development: “God was my first thought, Reason my second, Man my third and last.”  Human beings, not God, came to be the center of philosophy, and Feuerbach’s circle concluded that every sociopolitical institution should be “humanized.” 

Friedrich Engels observed in 1845 that virtually all German communists were Feuerbach’s followers, while most Feuerbachians turned communists.  Thus, humanism grew principally from German idealism, and socialism crystallized from humanism.  In that perplexing climate, the term did not signify individual liberty in the current sense; it meant subordinating individual interests to humanity conceived collectively.  Humanism was understood as the vehicle for dissolving the individual into the community and converting private property into collective property.

Feuerbachians considered religion, monarchy, and private property as forms of alienation: Human beings projected their powers onto external authorities and then found themselves dominated by them.  From the outset, this humanism was an openly anti-Christian current.

Leading German socialists such as Karl Marx and Wilhelm Marr framed the conflict as one between Christendom and Marxistdom.  To be fair, their formative arguments were equally hostile to every religion, including Judaism.  In the nineteenth century, humanism therefore functioned as both a smokescreen and a trampoline for socialist revolution.  Progressivism played a parallel role, focusing more on demands for progressive taxation than on human progress.  Feuerbachians held a quasi-transhumanist faith that humanity could become God; godlessness was merely the first step toward a worldwide proletarian revolution, supplemented by additional political techniques aimed at their collectivist goal.

Wilhelm Marr was a classic Feuerbachian radical.  He reportedly carried Feuerbach’s opus The Essence of Christianity everywhere and founded a secret society dedicated to spreading “humanist” ideas.  At one point he competed with Marx for leadership of the German left and lost.  The two men shared a common ideology and a personal antagonism; the chief difference was that Marx remained a theoretician, whereas Marr was a practical revolutionary.

Marr insisted that revolutionaries should avoid detailed positive programs, which frequently breed internal disagreement, and should instead unite around pure opposition to the status quo.  His treatise on secret societies in Switzerland captures the nihilistic, negationist phase of this humanism: “The masses can only be gathered under the flag of negation. … We make war against all prevailing ideas, of religion, of the State, of country, of patriotism.  The idea of God is the keystone of a perverted civilization.  It must be destroyed.  The true root of liberty, of equality, of culture, is Atheism.”

That was an extraordinarily radical stance.  Marr’s humanism was not mere secularism; it was an anti-establishment, revolutionary doctrine directed at the destruction of existing society.

John Rae’s 1884 book, Contemporary Socialism, confirms the point: Humanism envisioned the radical Feuerbachian maxim that God is dissolved into Man, monarchy into democracy, private property into collective possession, and the isolated individual into “social man.”  Rae states unequivocally that “humanist and communist became nearly convertible terms” and that “socialism was the humanism of common life.”

Marr emerged directly from this atmosphere.  Before becoming famous as the man who introduced the pre-existing term “antisemitism” into the political lexicon, he was a Feuerbachian humanist, atheist, and revolutionary agitator who preached negation and hostility.

Steeped in that milieu and carrying Feuerbach’s book, he absorbed a worldview of radical negation and human-centered materialism.  His later antisemitism can be read as a distorted continuation or inversion of those same ideas: “Jewishness” was identified with the egoistic, particularist, and alienating forces that Feuerbachian humanism sought to overcome through community, atheism, and social transformation.  In this reading, true humanism required purging the “Jewish” element that supposedly perpetuated older theological or capitalist alienations under new guises.

Marr was not alone.  Many early socialists and radicals — Fourier, Proudhon, numerous Young Hegelians, and substantial strands within leftism — expressed economic, racial, or cultural anti-Jewish prejudices.  They saw Jews as emblems of finance capital, middleman roles, or cosmopolitanism that obstructed national or proletarian solidarity.  Later anti-capitalist and antisemitic activists regularly employed a comparable scholastic structure, portraying finance, money, or “Jewish influence” as alien powers dominating authentic humanity.

When the negation of Jews acquires an explicit political background, it becomes antisemitism: Jews are cast as the obstacle against which non-Jews can bond and form a coherent left-wing political force.  Marr did not “rediscover” antisemitism in his 1879 pamphlet plainly because leftists disliked Jews; he reincarnated it as a means of securing voting blocs, forging alliances, and gaining power.  In short, Marr was one of the earlier “community organizers.”  His contemporaries would have also recognized Adolf Hitler as a fellow practitioner of the same cynical technique — consolidating support among non-Jews by alienating Jews — rather than as a mere primitive Jew-hater.  For certain currents on the left, Jews are expendable in the pursuit of unrestricted power and an unreachable utopia.

Modern humanism, secular or otherwise, claims to have shed these radical left associations.  Both humanism and antisemitism have deep socialist roots, but decades of left-wing polishing have buried those origins.  Marxist currents helped preserve and radicalize the word “humanism,” but modern humanism made up modern precisely by concealing much of its collectivist and revolutionary content.  The coinage of “humanitarianism” further obscured any resemblance to the nineteenth-century term.  Present-day humanitarians remain strikingly selective: Global attention has often focused substantially more intently on “Palestinian needs” while remaining predominantly indifferent to Israeli ones.

In conclusion, the connection between nineteenth-century humanism and antisemitism is both historical and moderately doctrinal.  Humanism did not explicitly list antisemitism among its foundational principles.  Rather, almost all influential European antisemites were formed within the radical humanist coalition and proceeded with its conceptual habits, revolutionary methods, and political techniques into a later, deliberately murkier context.  The journey from Feuerbachian universalism to Marr’s antisemitism remains one of the most paradoxical intellectual trajectories of nineteenth-century Europe.

History’s greatest disguise may not have been the invention of a new ideology, but the survival of an old one under a new and increasingly sanitized name. 

[Originally published in American Thinker]

What the Iran MOU Is Really All About

At this point, everyone is familiar with the 14 points of the Memorandum of Understanding between President Trump and remnants of Iran’s power structure. The document appears to use careful, ambiguous diplomatic language, but it actually serves as a raw political instrument.  To decipher its true meaning, one must strip away the mannerly phrasing and read it in the plain political lexicon — the language of power, elections, and survival.

Article 1 states that midterm elections in America will take place in November 2026.

Article 2 specifies that they will occur on November 3, 2026.

Article 3 notes that these elections are nearly four months away.

Article 4 calculates the remaining time as approximately 20 weeks.

Articles 5 through 14 continue in the same vein: They emphasize the narrowing window and the need for visible results before voters go to the polls.  They manifest the importance of avoiding distractions that could shift media focus.  Finally, they raised the requirement that any international agreements produce measurable domestic benefits in time for Election Day.

The document never says these things directly.  Instead, it speaks of “regional de-escalation,” “energy market stabilization,” and “confidence-building measures.” Translated into the realpolitik domain, however, every clause points to one overriding objective: securing a conservative majority in Congress on November 3, 2026.

Basically, these articles make the metric explicit.  To win those elections, the average price of gasoline across the United States must remain below $4 per gallon — roughly less than $1 per liter.  That single number has become the administration’s key performance indicator for the next four months.

This translation reveals the central truth the Memorandum aimed to obscure: The primary threat to American national security at this moment is not Iran.  On the contrary, it is the possibility that the Democrat party regains control of Congress.

In Israel, reactions to the Memorandum have often veered into panic.  However, the parallel threat for Israel is not Tehran, but the ideological and political allies of American left-wingers who seek to constrain Israeli freedom of action.  Commentators who have followed American and Israeli politics for years have long outlined this dynamic.  Many were shocked by the blunt, almost mechanical way the highest levels executed the calculation.

President Trump remains the strongest supporter of Israel the White House has seen in decades.  He moved the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, recognized the Golan Heights, and brokered the Abraham Accords.  Yet he is the president of the United States, not of Israel.

Losing the Republicans’ congressional majorities in 20 weeks will weaken, or even turn off, the legislative and oversight tools Trump’s administration has used to pursue the “America First” agenda.  Investigations and impeachments will multiply, and funding for border security and military modernization will face constant resistance.  Most likely, Democrats will pull foreign policy back toward the multilateral frameworks they favored in previous administrations.  Trump’s signature on the Memorandum with Iran is therefore not primarily about Iran at all.  It is about locking in enough momentum and public support so that even a narrowed majority — or the threat of one — cannot easily reverse the structural changes already underway.

The principal perceptible and immediate lever for achieving that momentum is energy prices.  American voters feel gasoline costs at the pump every week.  When prices rise sharply, approval ratings for the party in power tend to decline, regardless of other economic indicators.  Historical patterns (recall 2008, 2012, and particularly 2021–2022) demonstrate how quickly pocketbook pain translates into midterm losses.  The $4-per-gallon threshold has emerged as a coarse psychological and political demarcating line.  Above it, the narrative of economic competence weakens; below it, the administration can credibly claim that its policies are delivering tangible relief.

The day after they signed the Memorandum, the national average gasoline price fell to $3.99.  Oil markets responded with further downward pressure.  This was not a coincidence.  The agreement signaled that the risk of sudden supply disruptions from the Persian Gulf had decreased, at least for the critical pre-election window.  At the same time, the administration accelerated domestic permitting and leasing on federal lands.  The combination created the political dividend Trump required: noticeable, pocketbook-level proof that his approach to the Middle East produces lower costs for American families.

If the oil-price game is relatively easy for attentive pundits to follow, the information arena is more opaque.  Public disagreements between President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu have generated headlines suggesting a serious rift.  Those who recall last year’s public friction between Trump — the most powerful man on the planet — and Elon Musk — the richest man on the planet — will identify the pattern.  At the time, many interpreted the exchanges as genuine estrangement.  In reality, they served a tactical purpose: allowing each side to speak to different audiences while preserving the underlying alliance.  The same dynamic is now unmistakable between Washington and Jerusalem.

The current posture is a classic “good cop, bad cop” arrangement.  Trump projects reasonableness and restraint to international audiences and to American voters who prefer stability during an election season.  Netanyahu continues to cling to a hard line, conducting operations against Hezb’allah infrastructure in Lebanon and signaling that Israel will not be constrained by external timetables.  Both leaders comprehend that calm on the international stage between present and November benefits their respective domestic positions.  China must not create a crisis over Taiwan.  Gulf Arab states, recently unified by Trump’s pressure on Iran, must avoid provocative moves.  Iran itself must absorb the recent setbacks without launching major retaliation that could spike oil prices or monopolize American news cycles.  Quiet serves everyone’s electoral calendar.

This arrangement has forced a hard realization in parts of the Israeli political establishment: A superpower’s domestic political needs will always take precedence over the preferences of even its closest allies.  The observation is harsh, yet it reflects the structural reality of great-power politics.  No American president can afford to let foreign crises dictate the domestic narrative in the months before a midterm election, especially one that will determine whether his agenda survives the remainder of his term.

The 250th anniversary of American independence on July 4, 2026 adds another layer of calculation.  National milestones of this scale are carefully stage-managed.  The administration does not want global headlines on that date postulating that the United States is “trampling the independence” of another country.  By empowering Israel to handle immediate threats in Lebanon during the spring and summer, the United States creates space for its citizens to celebrate the anniversary without the overlay of fresh Middle East escalation.  Israeli operations that degrade Hezb’allah’s capabilities reduce the chance of a major attack that could force American involvement or dominate the news.  In that narrow but important sense, Israeli soldiers are helping ensure that American families can mark the semi-quincentennial in peace.  Such contributions are rarely acknowledged publicly, but they are remembered in the corridors of power.  Moreover, ordinary Americans will never forget that.

The Memorandum, stripped of diplomatic language, is therefore a timetable and a scorecard.  It establishes a 20-week timeline and defines success in terms that voters can effortlessly grasp: reduced gas prices, the absence of foreign crises, and a political climate stable enough to render the administration’s core reforms difficult to reverse.

Whether one views the Memorandum as cynical or merely realistic depends on how much weight one assigns to the domestic political survival of elected leaders in democratic systems.  In either case, the document makes explicit what experienced spectators have long understood: in the final analysis, the most consequential battles for both America and Israel are still being fought inside the American political system.

[Originally published in American Thinker]